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RECONCILING THE ERISA FIDUCIARYS DUAL RESPONSIBILITIES:
THE THIRD CIRCUIT ADOPTS A HEIGHTENED STANDARD OF
REVIEW IN PINTO v. RELIANCE STANDARD LJIE INSURANCE CO.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the United States, employers commonly provide health care benefits for their employees through group insurance plans.' Frequently,
these employees are insured under a plan governed by the Employment
Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"). 2 Under many ERISA plans,
an employee receives coverage for medical and other benefits through an

1. See BARBARA

COLEMAN, PRIMER ON EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY

ACT 21-24 (1989) (reviewing different types of insurance covered under ERISA).
2. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994) (outlining provisions of statute); 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(3) (1994) (defining employee benefit plan); 29 U.S.C. § 1003 (1994) (defining scope of Act). For a general discussion of ERISA, see Jay Conison, Suits for
Benefits Under ERISA, 54 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1992) (explaining litigation under
ERISA); George Lee Flint, Jr., ERISA: Reformulating the Federal Common Law for Plan
Interpretation,32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 955, 1027-46 (1995) (reviewing ERISA case law
since 1989); Peter D. Jacobson & Michael T. Cahill, The ChangingFace of Law and
Medicine in the New Millennium: Applying FiduciaryResponsibilities in the Managed Care
Context, 26 AM.J.L. & MED. 155, 155 (2000) (discussing role of fiduciary in medical
plans); Paul O'Neil, ProtectingERISA Health Care Claimants:PracticalAssessment of a
Neglected Issue in Health Care Reform, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 723, 723-24 (1994) (discussing
purpose of ERISA).
In 1974, ERISA was signed into law in order to protect the rights of American
employees regarding their pension benefits through federal legislation. See MARTIN WALD & DAVID KENTY, ERISA: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE 1 (1991) (discussing
history of ERISA). Congress enacted ERISA to correct specific defects that previously limited the usefulness of the private retirement system. See Nola A. Kohler,
Note, An Overview of the Inconsistency Among the Circuits Concerningthe Conflict of Interest Analysis Applied in an ERISA Action with an Emphasis on the Eighth Circuit'sAdoption
of the Sliding Scale Analysis in Woo v. Deluxe Corporation, 75 N.D. L. REV. 815, 815
(1999) (discussing Congress' purpose in enacting ERISA). ERISA governs not
only retirement plans, but also other employee benefits such as medical, welfare
and disability insurance. See id. The statute outlines appropriate procedures for
insurance companies to follow in setting up plan participation, vesting and funding. See id. (noting that ERISA was established to remedy previous problems in
retirement plan system). Congress' express purpose in creating ERISA was:
[T]o protect ... the interests of participants in employee benefit plans
and their beneficiaries, by requiring the disclosure and reporting to participants and beneficiaries of financial and other information with respect thereto, by establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and
obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by providing for
appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts.
29 U.S.C. § 1001(b). The statute also established an insurance system to protect
pension plans and provided express statutory fiduciary responsibility and full disclosure requirements to protect against the abuses in private pension plans. See
WALD & KENTY, supra, at 1 (discussing fiduciary duties pursuant to ERISA).
Section 1132 (a) (1) (B) of ERISA set forth one of the basic remedies provided
by Congress for employee-insureds. See 29 U.S.C § 1132 (1994) (explaining remedial nature of ERISA). Pursuant to that section, participants and beneficiaries

(855)
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insurance company that both determines benefit eligibility and distributes
benefits from its own funds.3 In other words, the administrator in charge
of the ERISA plan has two inconsistent and potentially conflicting interests: (1) administering the plan to the benefit of the employees as beneficiaries, and (2) maintaining the plan at a profit.4 A conflict of interest
occurs because the administrator is not only a fiduciary for the plan, but
5
also is responsible for sustaining profits for the insurance company.
have the right to recover, through a civil action, benefits accruing to them under
an employee benefit plan. See id. (describing rights under ERISA).
Courts have created a body of federal common law regarding the handling of
§ 1132 claims. SeeJeffrey A. Brauch, The Federal Common Law of ERISA, 21 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 541, 549-54 (1998) (discussing creation of common law ERISA
rules). ERISA itself does not specify the degree of deference that a court is to give
a plan administrator. See WALD & KENT', supra, at 227. Most often litigated in this
area is the scope of review to be applied in actions where the plaintiff challenges a
denial of benefits. See id.
3. See Deborah Shelby Dees, Overview of ERISA Provisions and Recent Legislation
Governing Group Health Plans, 67 Miss. LJ. 695, 697 (1998) (giving reasons why
ERISA was enacted). Employers generally contract with an insurance company to
administer and fund an ERISA plan for its employees. See Judith C. Brostron, The
Conflict of Interest Standardin ERISA Cases: Can It Be Avoided in the Denialof High Dose
Chemotherapy Treatment for Breast Cancer?, 3 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 1, 9 (1999)
(discussing procedure in which ERISA fiduciaries manage plans).
4. See Brostron, supra note 3, at 8 (noting that ERISA establishes fiduciary
duties for plan administrators). Under ERISA, a person is a fiduciary with respect
to a plan to the extent that:
(i) he [or she] exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority or
control respecting management or disposition of its assets, (ii) he [or
she] renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or
indirect, with respect to any moneys or other property of such plan, or
has any authority or responsibility to do so, or (iii) he [or she] has any
discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan.
29 U.S.C. § 1002(21) (A). The legislative history of ERISA shows that Congress intended the term "fiduciary" to be broadly construed. See Blatt v. Marshall & Lassman, 812 F.2d 810, 812 (2d Cir. 1987) ("The definition includes persons who have
authority and responsibility with respect to the matter in question, regardless of
their formal title." (citation omitted)).
5. See H. Brent McKnight, Assessing the Impact of Conflict of Interest on the Decisions ofERISA Fiduciaries,13 REGENT U. L. REv. 1, 24 (2000) (describing circumstances under which conflict of interest can arise in ERISA context). An
administrator of an ERISA plan is a fiduciary for the plan itself; therefore, he or
she is a trustee for the plan. See Dees, supra note 3, at 703-04 (describing fiduciary
role in ERISA plans). In this position of trust, an administrator is obligated to look
out for the best interests of the beneficiaries, not his or her own interests. See id. at
704-07 (outlining issues of trust law). The general duty of a trustee has been described as follows:
A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market
place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor most sensitive, is
the standard of behavior. As to this there has developed a tradition that
is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of the courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of
undivided loyalty by the "disintegrating erosion" of particular exceptions.
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ERISA provides that when a fiduciary denies benefits, an employee
may bring a civil action and ask the court to review the fiduciary's decision. 6 Specifically, when an employee challenges an ERISA administrator's denial of benefits under § 1132(a) (1) (B) 7 of the ERISA statute, a
court must decide whether the decision was influenced by a conflict aris8
ing from the inherent structural inconsistency of the 'fiduciary's role.
Under some circumstances, a fiduciary's conflict of interest will prompt
application of some form of close judicial review with respect to the adOnly thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level
higher than that trodden by the crowd.
Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (citation omitted). In a trust
context, the doctrine of conflict of interest plays an important role in protecting
the beneficiary by reducing the fiduciary's discretion. See McKnight, supra, at 25
(discussing role of conflict of interest).
6. SeeJonathan P. Heyl, Bedrick v. Travelers Insurance Co.: The Fourth Circuit's
Continued Attempt to Work with the "DoctrinalHash" of the Standard of Review in ERISA
Benefit-Denial Cases, 75 N.C. L. REv. 2382, 2382 (1997) (describing circumstances
under which employees can bring action against plan administrator).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1994).
8. See McKnight, supra note 5, at 1 (noting that ERISA permits fiduciary to
operate under conflict of interest). A trust is a fiduciary relationship in which one
person holds a property interest subject to an equitable obligation to keep or use
that interest for another's benefit. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2
(1959) (defining trusts). American trust law is governed by both statutory and
common law, and is guided by the RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS. See id. § 170 (describing governance of trust law and duty of loyalty).
One of the inherent characteristics of a trust is the fiduciary duty of the trustee to the beneficiary. SeeJoel C. Dobris, Changes in the Role and the Form of the Trust
at the New Millennium; or, We Don't Have to Think of England Anymore, 62 ALB. L. REv.
543, 549 (1998) (noting that loyalty is key part of fiduciary duty). The trustee is
under a duty to act in the best interests of the beneficiary of the trust. See GEORGE
GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAw OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES
§ 543 (rev. 2d ed. 1993) (discussing duty of loyalty).
Self-dealing by the trustee is prohibited as a conflict of interest; instead a trustee owes "fiduciary duties of good faith and reasonable care" in carrying out duties
of the trust. See Dardovitch v. Haltzman, 190 F.3d 125, 138 & n. 10 (3d Cir. 1999).
The trustee may not claim that, despite a conflict of interests, he or she served the
beneficiary's interest equally well or that her primary loyalty was not compromised
by a secondary loyalty. See Woods v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262, 269
(1941) (discussing fiduciary duty). Thus, a trustee who acts for some interest other
than that of the beneficiary may breach his or her duty of loyalty. See Seborowski v.
Pitt. Press Co., 188 F.3d 163, 170-71 (3d Cir. 1999) (describing fiduciary duty).
Under principles of equity, a trustee bears an unwavering duty of complete loyalty
to the beneficiary of the trust. See NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 336-37
(1981) (discussing duty of loyalty).
For further discussion of trust law, see generally Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Significant Trends in the Trust Law of the United States, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 531
(1999); Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Uniform Acts, Restatements, and Trends in American
Trust Law at Century's End, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1877 (2000); John H. Langbein, The
Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future of Trust Investing, 81 IowA L. REV. 641

(1996); and Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law's Race to the Bottom?,
85 CORNELL L. REv. 1035 (2000).
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ministrator's decision. 9 The rules governing the standard of review essentially dictate a case's outcome because a highly deferential standard will
permit the fiduciary to make a decision even if it is to the detriment of the
beneficiary; therefore, the standard used by the court is a critical factor for
an employee who is trying to attain benefits.) 0 Most courts, including the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, however, do not have
a clear technique under which the standard of review is implemented."
The United States Supreme Court has suggested a method by which
courts should evaluate discretionary benefit denials by conflicted ERISA
fiduciaries, but has never explicitly declared what standard of review
courts should employ in those circumstances. 1 2 If a plan provides the administrator with discretion to determine eligibility, the Court has recommended that a deferential standard be used, but that the conflict of
interest should be considered as a factor in the overall analysis. 1 3 Some
lower courts, including the Third Circuit, have interpreted the Supreme
Court's instructions to necessitate that they apply a deferential "arbitrary
and capricious" standard, while others have used a stricter de novo stan14
dard of review.
At present, the Third Circuit relies upon a heightened arbitrary and
capricious standard when reviewing a discretionary decision of a conflicted ERISA fiduciary. 15 Because the standard of review all but decides
9. See generally WALD & KENTv, supra note 2, at 153 (discussing ERISA fiduciary
duties); FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER ERISA 111 (1997) (examining litigation

in ERISA).
10. See STEVEN ALAN CHILDRESS &
REVIEW §§ 1.01-1.04 (92d ed. 1992)

MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF

(analyzing effect of review standards

generally).
11. See Third Circuit Addresses ERISA Administration and Funding Issues, MANAGED CARE LITIG. REP., June 19, 2000, at 4 (discussing impact of conflict on decision of court) [hereinafter ERISA Administration and Funding];J. Motley, Heightened
Review Is Warranted When an Insurer Both Funds and Runs Plans, N.J. LAw., July 10,
2000, at 20 (same); Third CircuitAddresses ContemporaneousERISA and FundingIssues,
INS. INDUSTRY LrIG. REP., June 28, 2000, at 7 (same).
12. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989) (leav-

ing question of standard of review unanswered).
13. See id. (reviewing conflict of interest); see also CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra

note 10, at §§ 15.01-15.02, 15.07-15.08 (describing review standards and applicability to facts).
14. See Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377, 387-88 (3d Cir.
2000) (discussing decisions of lower courts regarding standard to use for ERISA

conflict review). The Eleventh Circuit in particular has used a de novo standard.
See Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 898 F.2d 1556, 1558-59 (11th
Cir. 1990) (using de novo standard).
15. See Pinto, 214 F.3d at 393 (holding that heightened arbitrary and capricious standard of review was appropriate and that courts should utilize sliding scale
when reviewing conflicted fiduciary's decision). In the Third Circuit, the standard
of review in ERISA benefit denial cases has evolved over the years. See id. at 386-87
(reviewing law of Third Circuit).
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whether benefits will or will not be distributed, both insurers and insureds
16
should understand the recent analysis undertaken by the Third Circuit.
This Casebrief examines the legal standard of review that the Third
Circuit applies to decisions made by conflicted ERISA fiduciaries. 17 Part I
of this Casebrief briefly describes ERISA's role in insurance law.' 8 Part II
examines the historical development of the standard of review in ERISA
suits. 19 Part III describes the Third Circuit's adoption of a heightened
arbitrary and capricious standard of review. 20 Part IV examines whether
2
the Third Circuit's standard of review satisfactorily meets ERISA's goals. '
Finally, Part V concludes that the Third Circuit adopted an appropriate
22
standard of review.

II.

HISTORY OF THE STANDARD OF REVIEW APPLIED TO

A.

ERISA

CASES

Trust Law's Relationship to ERISA

Because an ERISA plan administrator is a fiduciary, trust law principles apply to the administration of the plan. 23 In the past, the trust attributes of ERISA have led courts, including the Third Circuit, to apply a
highly deferential standard of review when examining an administrator's
discretionary decisions. 2 4 At times, however, a conflict of interest arises
due to the role of the administrator as a fiduciary, coupled with the admin16. See Dees, supra note 3, at 707 (describing importance of standard of review
in ERISA cases); see also CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 10, § 15.01 (discussing review standards generally). The de novo standard requires that no deference be
given to an administrator's decision. See id. Under the abuse of discretion standard, however, "a plan administrator's decision must be sustained as a matter of
law unless proven arbitrary and capricious." Id.
17. For a discussion of the legal standard of review used in ERISA, see infra
notes 26-33 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the purpose of ERISA, see supra notes 1-16 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of the development of the common law standard of review for ERISA, see infra notes 27-82 and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of the law of the ERISA standard of review in the Third
Circuit, see infra notes 83-130 and accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of whether the standard of review developed by the Third
Circuit meets ERISA's goals, see infra notes 131-64 and accompanying text.
22. For a discussion of whether the Third Circuit established an appropriate
standard of review, see infra notes 165-67 and accompanying text.
23. For further discussion of trust law generally, see supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text. Courts have noted that ERISA contains trust law terminology
and language. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101,110 (1989)
("ERISA abounds with the language and terminology of trust law.").
24. SeeJung v. FMC Corp., 755 F.2d 708, 711 (9th Cir. 1985) (applying arbitrary and capricious standard of review to conflicted decision). Case law shows a
split in the courts as to the appropriate review standard. Compare Pinto v. Reliance
Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377, 392 (3d Cir. 2000) (adopting sliding scale
standard which requires decreased deference to fiduciary's decision in order to
protect beneficiary), with Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 898 F.2d
1556, 1559 (11th Cir. 1990) (adopting de novo approach to review of conflicted
ERISA fiduciary's decision).
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istrator's need to make a profit for the company. 25 In this conflicted state
of affairs, a highly deferential standard of review does not sufficiently rec26
oncile the fiduciary's dual role.

B.

The ERISA Standard of Review

ERISA itself conveys no guidelines concerning the standard under
which benefit decisions should be reviewed. 27 The federal courts, however, have developed common law to answer the various questions accompanying review of an ERISA fiduciary's decisions. 28 Specifically, the Third
Circuit has endeavored to reconcile the fiduciary's dual role by using a
heightened standard of review in which the court examines the conflict of
interest as a factor.29 In contrast, other circuits review an administrator's
decision under an extremely deferential standard, in which case an em31
ployee has little hope of recovering benefits through an ERISA action.
The administrator of an ERISA plan is often given discretion to decide an employee's benefit eligibility even when that administrator also
25. See Brostron, supra note 3, at 10'(discussing development of deferential
standard of review for ERISA, even under conflict of interest). The standard of
conduct imposed on fiduciaries is that of a prudent person. See Dees, supra note 3,
at 703-04 (discussing fiduciaries' duties under ERISA).
26. See Pagan v. NYNEX Pension Plan, 52 F.3d 438, 442 (2d Cir. 1995) (affording fiduciary of ERISA plan great discretion in making decision under conflict of
interest). But see Brown, 898 F.2d at 1558 (adopting de novo approach to review of
conflicted ERISA fiduciary's decision). The judicial review in such cases has been
inconsistent. See McKnight, supra note 5, at 12-17 (discussing various courts' holdings on question of standard of review to use in conflicted ERISA fiduciary
decisions).
27. See McKnight, supra note 5, at 2 (discussing lack of explicit text in ERISA
setting forth standard of review for courts to follow); see also Heyl, supranote 6, at
2382 (same).
28. See Brauch, supra note 2, at 543 (discussing generally phenomena of ERISA litigation and creation of federal common law). The doctrine under which
courts are authorized to create common law to fill the legislative gaps in ERISA is
well settled. See id. (stating that courts create federal common law for ERISA although statute itself does not explicitly allow this).
Federal common law is often developed to effectuate Congress' intent regarding a statute. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKv, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 6.3 (3d ed. 1999)
(discussing necessity of federal common law to implement intent behind federal
statute). Generally, the expression "federal common law" refers to the "development of legally binding federal law by the federal courts in the absence of directly
controlling constitutional or statutory provisions." Id. § 3.1.
29. Compare Pinto, 214 F.3d at 391-92 (requiring decreased deference to fiduciary's decision in order to protect beneficiary), with Mers v. Marriot Int'l Group
Accidental Death & Dismemberment Plan, 144 F.3d 1014, 1020 (7th Cir. 1998)
(presuming that fiduciary acts in best interests of beneficiary even under conflict
of interest).
30. CompareWhitney v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 106 F.3d 475, 477-78
(2d Cir. 1997) (using deferential standard of review so that employee was unable
to recover benefits), and Sullivan v. LTV Aerospace & Def. Co., 82 F.3d 1251, 125556 (2d Cir. 1996) (same), with Mitchell v. Eastman Kodak Co., 113 F.3d 433, 438
(3d Cir. 1997) (allowing beneficiary to recover benefits where fiduciary acted in
arbitrary and capricious manner).
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funds the plan, thereby giving rise to a conflict of interest.3 1 Under these
circumstances, if an employee goes to court in the Third Circuit to recover
benefits due under the plan, the court will be icalled upon to decide
whether the discretion afforded to the fiduciary was abused. 32 The standard of review, which the court uses when reassessing the denial of a request for benefits, is critical because the cause of action often fails or
succeeds depending on the degree of deference shown to the administra33
tor's decision.
C.

Federal Common Law: Development of the ERISA Standard of Review

ERISA § 502(a) (1) (B) provides that insureds may bring a civil suit to
recover benefits, enforce benefits or clarify their rights to future benefits
due under an ERISA plan. 34 The statute does not, however, provide a
standard of review that courts are to apply to a challenged benefits decision. 35 Thus, the courts have developed a "uniform federal common law"
36
to govern the decisions of a fiduciary administering an ERISA plan.
31. See Brostron, supra note 3, at 8-10 (discussing ERISA plans). In a plan's
language, an administrator can be given discretion for decision-making. See id. at
13 (reviewing grant of discretionary authority). This feature requires that a court
reviewing the decision give great deference to the fiduciary, which does not always
protect the beneficiary adequately. SeeJohn H. Langbein, The Supreme Court Hunks
Trusts, 1990 SuP. CT. REV. 213 (1990) (discussing ERISA fiduciary). Langbein
states that:
Perhaps the feature of ERISA architecture that most clearly manifests the
tension within ERISA's transposed norms of private trust law is ERISA's
authorization of the nonneutral fiduciary ....
ERISA section 408(c) (3)
authorizes the employer or other plan sponsor to have its own 'officer,
employee, agent, or other representative' serve as the trustee or in other
fiduciary capacities for the plan.
Id.
32. See Kevin Walker Beatty, Commentary, A Decade of Confusion: The Standard
of Review for ERISA Benefit Denial Claims as Established by Firestone, 51 AlA. L. REv.
733, 735-38 (2000) (discussing use of arbitrary and capricious standard under ERISA). ERISA requires that the plan administrator "discharge his [or her] duties
with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries
and.., for the exclusive purpose of... providing benefits to participants and their
beneficiaries." 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1994).
33. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1) (B) (1994) (describing litigation procedures for ERISA). When a court uses a very deferential standard of review, the
decision-maker is afforded great reverence. See Brostron, supra note 3, at 18 (discussing differences between standards of review under ERISA). On the other
hand, if a fiduciary's decision is carefully scrutinized, the beneficiary receives great
protection from decisions that are considered an abuse of discretion. See id.
(same).
34. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1) (B) (1994) (outlining procedures for ERISA litigation); see also Brostron, supra note 3, at 9 (describing provisions of ERISA).
35. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 108-09 (1989)
(noting that Court had to define appropriate standard of review for conflict of
interest cases under ERISA); cf. Brostron, supra note 3, at 11 (noting that standard
of review for ERISA has been inconsistently developed).
36. See Evans v. Safeco Life Ins. Co., 916 F.2d 1437, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1990)
(noting that standard of review was developed under common law principles). But
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Initially, the federal common law set forth an arbitrary and capricious
standard, which was derived from the standard used in the Labor Management Relations Act 3 7 ("LMRA"). 38 The courts' application of the arbitrary
and capricious standard in early ERISA cases showed deference to plan
administrators, although the exact standard used varied from extreme def39
erence to more careful scrutiny.

1.

Supreme Court Guidance

In 1989, the United States Supreme Court decided Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Bruch,4 0 and attempted to elucidate the proper standard of
review that courts should use when examining a denial of benefits challenged under ERISA. 4 1 In Firestone, the Court held that a denial of benefits challenged under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) should be reviewed de
novo regardless of whether the plan was funded or unfunded, and regardless of whether the fiduciary was operating under a potential or actual
conflict of interest. 42 The Court added an important caveat, however, and
stated that the de novo standard would not apply if the benefit plan gave
the fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or
43
to construe the terms of the plan.
cf Joseph F. Cunningham, ERISA: Some Thoughts on Unfulfilled Promises, 49 ARK. L.
REv. 83, 86 (1996) (stating that courts have not adequately construed ERISA to
protect beneficiaries).
37. Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (1947).
38. See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 109 (discussing LMRA). The LMRA governs employee benefit plans established under collective bargaining agreements. See id.
The federal courts employ the arbitrary and capricious standard in reviewing all
denials in LMRA cases. See id. at 109; see also Struble v. N.J. Brewery Employee's
Welfare Trust Fund, 732 F.2d 325, 333 (3d Cir. 1984) (discussing LMRA).
39. See, e.g., Booth v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 201 F.3d 335, 341 (4th Cir. 2000)
(using deferential abuse of discretion standard); Mitchell v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
113 F.3d 433, 437 (3d Cir. 1997) (using deferential standard of review); Atwood v.
Newmont Gold Co., 45 F.3d 1317, 1323 (9th Cir. 1995) (refusing to give deference
to administrator's presumptively void decision); Doe v. Group Hosp. & Med.
Servs., 3 F.3d 80, 87 (4th Cir. 1993) (using de novo standard of review).
40. 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
41. See id. at 115 (arriving at conclusion regarding standard of review under
ERISA). Firestone Company acted as an administrator of an ERISA plan that provided termination pay for employees who were laid off due to a reduction in the
work force. See id. at 105 (giving facts of case). When Firestone sold its Plastics
Division to Occidental Petroleum in 1980, employees sought benefits under the
plan, claiming that the sale was a reduction in workforce under the terms of the
plan. See id. Firestone denied benefits to the employees on the grounds that Occidental had rehired the employees, at identical pay. See id. The employees filed
suit, requesting that benefits be granted as promised in the plan. See id. at 106.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict among the circuits as
to the appropriate standard of review for an action under § 1132(a) (1) (B). See id.
at 108.
42. See id. at 118.
43. See id. at 115 ("Of course, if a benefit plan gives discretion to an administrator or fiduciary who is operating under a conflict of interest, that conflict may
be weighed as a 'facto[r] in determining whether there is an abuse of discretion."'
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Therefore, if a plan does not confer discretion on the fiduciary, then
the requisite standard of review is de novo. 44 If the plan does confer discretion, however, then the decision will be reviewed under an abuse of
discretion, or arbitrary and capricious, standard, even if the fiduciary has a
conflict of interest. 45 In the latter case, the occurrence of the conflict is
one of many factors in determining whether there is an abuse of discretion, although the Court did not explain the relative weight that the con46
flict should be afforded.
In establishing the guidelines for the ERISA standard of review, the
Firestone Court relied heavily on trust law principles. 4 7 The Court reasoned that doing so met with ERISA's primary objectives. 48 Pursuant to
this framework, the Court effectively suggested that, in certain cases, a
conflict of interest does not influence the analysis unless an abuse of discretion is first demonstrated. 49 Thus, if a plan contains language that
grants discretion to the plan administrator to interpret the plan and determine eligibility, the standard of review used by the courts should be deferential.50 In this situation, plaintiffs who have been denied benefits will
51
rarely obtain relief or recover damages.
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 (1959))); see also Pagan v.
NYNEX Pension Plan, 52 F.3d 438, 442 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that Firestone requires courts to use conflict as factor in deciding whether there has been abuse of
discretion).
44. See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115 (noting that de novo standard of review applies regardless of conflict).
45. See id. (noting that if plan grants discretion to administrator, abuse of discretion standard should be used). Generally speaking, the arbitrary and capricious
standard is the same as abuse of discretion. See Nazay v. Miller, 949 F.2d 1323,
1336 (3d Cir. 1991) (discussing abuse of discretion standard); Daniels v. Anchor
Hocking Corp., 758 F. Supp. 326, 328-30 (W.D. Pa. 1991) (same). But see Booth v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 210 F.3d 335, 341 (4th Cir. 2000) (assuming difference between abuse of discretion and arbitrary and capricious standard). Under the arbitrary and capricious standard, a district court may overturn a decision of a plan
administrator only if it is "without reason, unsupported by substantial evidence or
erroneous as a matter of law." Abnathya v. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 2 F.3d 40, 45
(3d Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).
46. See Firestone,489 U.S. at 115 (setting forth exception to de novo review for
situations in which ERISA fiduciary operates under conflict of interest). For a discussion of the impact of Firestone on the circuit courts, see infra notes 58-82 and
accompanying text.
47. See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 110 (noting that ERISA legislative history clearly
incorporated trust law principles into statute). For further discussion of trust law
principles and ERISA, see supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
48. See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 108 (noting that ERISA was enacted to protect
and provide remedies for participants and beneficiaries of benefit plans); see also
Mass. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 136 (1985) (same).
49. See Beatty, supra note 32, at 739 (describing Supreme Court test for conflict of interest under ERISA).
50. See id. at 740 (noting that questions regarding Firestone standard of review
for ERISA fiduciaries still remain).
51. See Brostron, supra note 3, at 11 (stating that remedies under ERISA are
equitable in nature). Under ERISA, a beneficiary may recover the monetary bene-
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The scope of the holding in Firestonehas been debated since its inception.5 2 The split in authority stems from the language of the opinion itself.5 3 Firestone required that a conflict of interest be one of many factors
used in reviewing the administrator's discretionary decision, but did not
distinguish the relative import of the conflict. 54 Unfortunately, the ques-

tion regarding the precise standard to use when an administrator is given
discretion in a plan and acts under a conflict was left unanswered by the
55

Court.

As a result, lower federal courts, including the Third Circuit, have
interpreted differently the mandates in Firestone.56 In particular, the Third
Circuit has interpreted, the ambiguity to require a review of a conflicted
fiduciary's decisions that acknowledges the conflict. 57 The uncertainty left

in the wake of Firestonehas encouraged courts to use different approaches

fit of the denied coverage, but cannot sue for lost wages, pain and suffering, or
wrongful death. See id.
52. See generally id. at 18 (noting that circuits courts have applied different
standards of review for ERISA conflict cases).
53. See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 105-08 (reviewing ways in which conflicts can be
scrutinized). Speaking for the Court, Justice O'Connor explained early in the
opinion that "the discussion which follows is limited to the appropriate standard of
review in § 1132(a)(1)(B) actions challenging denials of benefits based on plan
interpretations." Id. at 108. Later, however, O'Connor wrote that such a challenged action would be reviewed de novo "unless the benefit plan gives the administrator . . . discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to
construe the terms of the plan." Id. at 115.
54. See, e.g., McKnight, supra note 5, at 4 (reviewing analysis employed by
Court in Firestone). In Firestone, the Court relied on trust law principles when
describing the factors a court should examine to determine whether an ERISA
administrator abused his or her discretion. See id. at 7 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 (1959)).
55. See Kirill Abramov, Woo v. Deluxe Corporation: The Eighth Circuit Adopts
the Sliding Scale Standard of Review When a Conflicted Plan AdministratorDenies ERISA
Protected Benefits, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1368, 1375 (1999) (noting different standards
used by different courts); Beatty, supra note 32, at 735 (describing development of
current standards); Kohler, supra note 2, at 816 (noting difficulty in determining
proper standard for ERISA cases).
56. See Bedrick v. Travelers Ins. Co., 93 F.3d 149, 154 (4th Cir. 1996) (using
heightened standard of review); Doe v. Group Hosp. & Med. Servs., 3 F.3d 80, 80
(4th Cir. 1993) (same); Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 898 F.2d 1556,
1561 (11th Cir. 1990) (using de novo review). But seeTreimain v. Bell Indus., Inc.,
196 F.3d 970, 976 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting times when deferential standard is appropriate); Rowan v. Unum Life Ins. Co., 119 F.3d 433, 436 (6th Cir. 1997) (using
arbitrary and capricious review); Yeager v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 88 F.3d
376, 380-82 (6th Cir. 1996) (same); Epright v. Envtl. Res. Mgmt., 81 F.3d 335, 341
(3d Cir. 1996) (same); Heasley v. Belden & Blake Corp., 2 F.3d 1249, 1249 (3d Cir.
1993) (noting that fiduciary's decision should not be disturbed by court).
57. See Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377, 379 (3d Cir.
2000) (holding that heightened arbitrary and capricious review was required when
examining conflicted ERISA fiduciary's decision).
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to resolve the same issue, which in turn has generated uncertainty for the
58
litigants involved in some ERISA cases.
2.

Circuit Courts React to Firestone

The circuit courts have disagreed over how the Firestone standard
should be applied in cases where an employee is seeking to recover benefits denied by a conflicted fiduciary. 59 In Firestone, the Court noted in
dicta that the existence of a fiduciary's conflict of interest is a factor to
consider when deciding whether a denial of benefits is arbitrary and capricious. 60 Specifically, the Court stated that "if a benefit plan gives discretion to an administrator or fiduciary who is operating under a conflict of
interest, that conflict must be weighed as a 'factor in determining whether
61
there is an abuse of discretion.'"
Given the ambiguous language in Firestone regarding the manner in
which a conflict is reconciled with the administrator's fiduciary duty, circuit courts, including the Third Circuit, have been inconsistent in deciding the particular way a conflict of interest factors into the review of a
fiduciary's denial of ERISA benefits. 62 First, as a threshold matter, courts

do not agree on the circumstances under which a conflict is found to exist. 63 Some courts discern a conflict when an administrator both funds
and administers a plan; others, however, do not find a conflict unless there
64
is conclusive evidence of self-dealing.
58. See McKnight, supra note 5, at 9 (noting differences among circuits in application of Firestone analysis).

59. See Woo v. Deluxe Corp., 144 F.3d 1157, 1161 (8th Cir. 1998) (adopting
sliding scale approach); Cisneros v. Unum Life Ins. Co., ,134 F.3d 939, 942 (9th Cir.
1998) (stating that review used depends on facts of case); Armstrong v. Aetna Life
Ins. Co., 128 F.3d 1263, 1264 (8th Cir. 1997) (using de novo review); Pierre v.

Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 932 F.2d 1552, 1556 (5th Cir. 1991) (using deferential
abuse of discretion standard of review); Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees' Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1049 (7th Cir. 1987) (adopting sliding scale approach).
60. See Firestone Tire & Rubber v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989) (describing standard of review for decision of ERISA fiduciary under conflict of interest).
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., Booth v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 201 F.3d 335, 341 (4th Cir. 2000)
(applying deferential abuse of discretion standard); Mitchell v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 113 F.3d 433, 437 (3d Cir. 1997) (using deferential standard of review);
Atwood v. Newmont Gold Co., 45 F.3d 1317, 1323 (9th Cir. 1995) (refusing to give
deference to administrator's presumptively void decision); Pierre,932 F.2d at 1556
(using deferential abuse of discretion standard of review).
63. See Brostron, supra note 3, at 15-17 (noting different approaches to finding conflict in ERISA plans).
64. Compare Brown v. Blue Cross .& Blue Shield, Inc., 898 F.2d 1556, 1561
(11 th Cir. 1990) (finding inherent conflict where insurance company both funds
and administers ERISA plan), and Vega v. Nat'l Life Ins. Serv., Inc., 188 F.3d 287,
287 (5th Cir. 1999) (same), with Mers v. Marriot Int'l Group Accidental Death &
Dismemberment Plan, 144 F.3d 1014, 1016 (7th Cir. 1998) (requiring specific evidence to show that insurance company operates under conflict of interest), and
Whitney v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 106 F.3d 475, 477 (3d Cir. 1997)
(same).
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Second, and more importantly, if a conflict is discovered, circuit
65
courts differ as to how the conflict should affect the standard of review.
Most courts, including the Third Circuit, conclude that the nature of the
relationship between the administrator, the funds and the beneficiary encourages self-dealing; therefore, a closer examination, via heightened review of the decision, is required. 66 Other courts accede to heightened
review only if there is evidence that the conflict has materially affected the
denial of benefits.

67

The circuit courts have developed two different approaches to deciding how the conflict affects the standard of review: the "sliding scale ap69
test. The Forth, 70 Fifth, 71
proach" 68 and the "presumptively void"
72
73
Seventh and Tenth Circuits have adopted the sliding scale approach,
which requires the reviewing court to apply the arbitrary and capricious
standard, but intensifies scrutiny as the conflict increases.74 Under the
sliding scale approach, a court will use different degrees of deference
when reviewing a fiduciary's decision, depending upon the seriousness of
65. See McKnight, supra note 5, at 8 (noting that circuits use different standards of review for ERISA fiduciary's decision under conflict of interest).
66. See Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377, 384 (3d Cir.
2000) (presuming that conflict of interest exists); cf.Brostron, supra note 3, at 18
(discussing standard of review when courts find conflict under ERISA).
67. See Sullivan v. LTV Aerospace & Def. Co., 82 F.3d 1251, 1255-56 (2d Cir.
1996) (requiring evidence of conflict before scrutinizing fiduciary's decision).
68. See McKnight, supra note 5, at 8 (noting that courts are divided into "sliding scale" and "presumptively void" jurisdictions that differ in treatment of conflict
of interest in ERISA cases). Commentators use varying terms for the tests employed by the circuit courts; this Casebrief employs the terminology "sliding scale"
and "presumptively void."
69. See generally Brostron, supra note 3, at 18 (stating that some courts use
standard of de novo review to scrutinize ERISA fiduciaries).
70. See Bedrick v. Travelers Ins. Co., 93 F.3d 149, 154 (4th Cir. 1996) (noting
that fiduciaries may have conflict of interests when profits are influenced by payment of claims); Doe v. Group Hosp. & Med. Servs., 3 F.3d 80, 80 (4th Cir. 1993)
(discussing inherent conflict present when insurance company's profits depend
upon denial or acceptance of claims).
71. See Vega v. Nat'l Life Ins. Servs., Inc., 188 F.3d 287, 296 (5th Cir. 1999)
(noting incentive to self-deal where insurance company administers benefits from
its own plans); Wilber v. ARCO Chem. Co., 974 F.2d 631, 636 (5th Cir. 1992)
(holding that administrator's decision cannot receive deference).
72. See Mers v. Marriot Int'l Group Accidental Death and Dismemberment
Plan, 144 F.3d 1014, 1019-20 (7th Cir. 1998) (using sliding scale to measure abuse
of discretion); Chojnacki v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 108 F.3d 810, 815-16 (7th Cir.
1997) (finding no conflict); Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees Pension Trust,
836 F.2d 1048, 1052-53 (7th Cir. 1987) (same).
73. See, e.g., McGraw v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 137 F.3d 1253, 1259 (10th
Cir. 1998) (using arbitrary and capricious standard); Sempter v. Group Health
Serv., Inc., 129 F.3d 1390, 1393 (10th Cir. 1997) (same); Chambers v. Family
Health Plan Corp., 100 F.3d 818, 825 (10th Cir. 1996) (same).
74. See McKnight, supra note 5, at 8 (describing sliding scale test).
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the conflict.7

5

Thus, the arbitrary and capricious standard is given some

76

flexibility.
Courts that use this standard scrutinize each case on the facts,
77
with the conflict as one of many factors in the analysis.
The Ninth 78 and Eleventh 7 9 Circuits have implemented the presumptively void test, which presumes that an ERISA administrator's decision to
deny benefits is arbitrary and capricious unless the administrator can
prove that the conflict of interest had no material effect on the choice. 80
Given the inherent structural conflict present in some ERISA plans, an
administrator has the burden to prove that the beneficiary's interests were
truly advanced by the decision. 8 1 Courts applying this test are often strict
in requiring evidence to demonstrate an actual conflict; however, once a
conflict is revealed, they utilize the de novo standard to review the deci82
sion itself.
3.

Third Circuit Stance on ERISA Review Standards
83

Until its recent decision in Pinto v. Reliance Standard Insurance Co.,
the Third Circuit had not addressed the precise issue of what standard of
review to use when an insurance company administrator, operating under
a conflict of interest, denies benefits under an ERISA plan. 8 4 The court
75. See Buttram v. Cent. States, 76 F.3d 896, 900 n.6 (8th Cir. 1996) (defining
sliding scale test); Chambers, 100 F.3d at 825 (same).
76. See Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co, 214 F.3d 377, 388 (3d Cir.
2000) (analyzing whether heightened review is required for ERISA fiduciary's decision under conflict of interest). The arbitrary and capricious standard and the
abuse of discretion standard are generally considered synonymous. See Cox v. MidAm. Dairyman, Inc., 965 F.2d 569, 572 n.3 (8th Cir. 1992) (noting that there is no
distinction between arbitrary and capricious standard and abuse of discretion),
affd, 13 F.3d 272 (8th Cir. 1993); see also CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 10,
§§ 15.07-15.08 (comparing review standards).
77. See Pinto, 214 F.3d at 393 (describing application of heightened arbitrary
and capricious review standard); see aso Vega v. Nat'l Life Ins. Servs., Inc., 188 F.3d
287, 296 (5th Cir. 1999) (using sliding scale approach); Miller v. Metro. Life Ins.
Co., 128 F.3d 1263, 1265 (8th Cir. 1997) (same); Chambers, 100 F.3d at 826-27
(same). Other factors a court may consider when reviewing a fiduciary's decision
include: the sophistication of the parties; the information available to the parties;
the financial status of the insurance company; and the current status of the fiduciary. See Pinto, 214 F.3d at 392 (discussing factors to be included in sliding scale
analysis).
78. See Atwood v. Newmont Gold, 45 F.3d 1317, 1322-23 (9th Cir. 1995) (shifting burden to insurance company to prove that denial did not harm beneficiary).
79. See Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc. 898 F.2d 1556, 1566-67 (lth
Cir. 1990) (using presumptively void test).
80. See McKnight, supra note 5, at 15 (describing presumptively void approach
to review ERISA fiduciary's discretionary decision).
81. See id. at 5-6 (noting factors in structure of insurance company giving rise
to conflict of interest).
82. See id. at 9-10 (describing de novo or "presumptively void" review
standard).
83. 214 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2000).
84. See Pinto, 214 F.3d at 386 ("We have not previously addressed the precise
issue in this case.").
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has, however, discussed the appropriate standard of review for ERISA ben85
efit decisions in other contexts since Firestonewas decided.
In 1991, the Third Circuit first examined the standard of review for
ERISA cases in Nazay v. Miller.8 6 In Nazay, the Third Circuit applied an
unmodified arbitrary and capricious standard in reviewing a denial of hospital benefits for an insured employee. 8 7 Accordingly, the Third Circuit
held that the insurance company, which had no conflict of interest, did
not breach its fiduciary duty by instituting a precertification system for
benefits. 8 8 In so holding, the Third Circuit relied on Firestonefor the pro-

position that an arbitrary and capricious standard should be used when an
administrator is vested with discretion to waive a precertification
89
requirement.
The same year, the Third Circuit decided Ketrosits v. GATX Corp."'
Ketrosits held that the unmodified arbitrary and capricious review was
proper in the absence of specific, tangible evidence that a structural conflict influenced the decision process. 91 In doing so, the Third Circuit suggested that the arbitrary and capricious standard outlined by Firestone is
shaped by the circumstances in which a decision is made. 9 2 Thus, the
Third Circuit anticipated that a conflict could be a circumstance consid93
ered under the arbitrary and capricious review standard.
85. See id. at 29-33 (noting evolution of standards of review for ERISA in general). For a discussion of the Third Circuit's examination of ERISA standards of
review, see supra notes 82-83 and infra notes 86-103 and accompanying text.
86. 949 F.2d 1323 (3d Cir. 1991).
87. See Nazay, 949 F.2d at 1329-30 (discussing standard of review to apply
when examining ERISA administrator fiduciary duties). Nazay was a retired employee of Bethlehem Steel Corporation ("BSC"), which provided insurance benefits under a Comprehensive Medical Program. See id. at 1325-26 (stating facts of
case). Nazay did not notify his plan's administrator before he admitted himself to
a hospital for heart disease. See id. Because Nazay did not obtain precertification,
the plan imposed a thirty percent penalty, effectively denying benefits. See id. at
1326-27. The Third Circuit relied upon the lack of an actual conflict of interest in
making its decision. See id. at 1329.
88. See id. at 1326 (stating holding). Failure to acquire precertification from
the insurer resulted in a penalty, equal to thirty percent of otherwise covered expenses. See id.
89. See id. at 1334 (reviewing reasoning of holding).
90. 970 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir. 1992).
91. See Ketrosits, 970 F.2d at 1173 (stating rationale of holding). In Kotrosits,
the Third Circuit found no bias in the administrator's decision, and therefore did
not apply a heightened standard of review. See id. at 1172 n.5 (reviewing facts in
case). Plaintiffs claimed that they were entitled to early retirement benefits under
an ERISA plan when the company was sold, on the grounds that the sale was not a
"layoff." See id. at 1167.
92. See id. at 1171-72 (reconciling rationale of Firestone to specific facts of
case).
93. See id. at 1171 (noting that ERISA review should comply with trust law
principles depending on facts of case). The party who urges the court that discretion was abused has the burden to offer proof of the harm. See id. at 1173 (reviewing record to find proof of negative impact on beneficiaries of ERISA plan).
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In Abnathya v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc.,94 the Third Circuit found that

an insurance company did not benefit from its decisions to reject claims;
therefore, a deferential standard was adequate when reviewing the administrator's decision. 9 5 Unlike the inquiry in Pinto, the analysis assumed that
the administrator followed the requirements of the ERISA plan and in
doing so, was not conflicted. 96 The court suggested, however, that a company that profited directly from the denial of benefits would be subject to
97
a stricter standard.
The court examined the matter again in Heasley v. Belden & Blake
Corp. 8 This decision verified the Third Circuit's willingness to use a form
of heightened arbitrary and capricious scrutiny when an insurance company both funds and administers a plan.9 9 In this case, the court applied a
de novo standard of review, but observed that if the plan had given the
administrator the discretion to interpret the plan's terms, a examination
using close scrutiny of the abuse of discretion would have been
appropriate. 100
Thus, by negative implication, these cases signified that if given the
opportunity, the Third Circuit would apply a heightened standard of review in an ERISA case when a fiduciary has a conflict of interest.1 0 1 Such a
94. 2 F.3d 40 (3d Cir. 1993).
95. See Abnathya, 2 F.3d at 48 (stating holding). Aline Abnathya brought a suit
against her employer for its decision to discontinue her long-term disability benefits, which were maintained through a self-funded employee benefits plan governed by ERISA. See id. at 42-43. The Third Circuit found no basis in the record
that the decision was arbitrary and capricious, and reversed the district court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of the insured. See id. at 47.
96. See id. at 46 (discussing possible conflict of interest). Under the arbitrary
and capricious standard of review, a court can reverse the administrator's decision
only if it is "without reason, unsupported by substantial evidence or erroneous as a
matter of law." Id. at 45 (quoting Adamo v. Anchor Hocking Corp., 720 F. Supp. 491,
500 (W.D. Pa. 1989)).
97. See id. at 46 n.5 (discussing requirements of review under Firestone). The
Abnathya court concluded that the employer had sufficient evidence to deny
Abnathya's application for long-term disability benefits; thus, it deferred to the
administrator's decision. See id. at 4648.
98. 2 F.3d 1249 (3d Cir. 1993).
99. See Heasley, 2 F.3d at 1260 & n.12 (noting circumstances under which conflict of interest can occur). In 1991, Richard Heasley was diagnosed with a type of
neuroendocrine tumor. See id. at 1252-53. After diagnosing the tumor, doctors
recommended that Heasley have a liver/pancreas transplant, but the insurance
company denied coverage for the transplant because it considered the surgery to
be experimental. See id. Heasley sued under ERISA's civil action provision, 29
U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1) (1994). See id. at 1253.
100. See id. at 1254 (discussing deferential standard of review). The Third
Circuit noted that the appropriate standard of review "turns on the terms of the
plan." Id.
101. See id. at 1251 (finding that fiduciary interest should not be disturbed by
court). The Third Circuit has examined this issue in other cases in the last decade.
See generally Harte v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 214 F.3d 446 (3d Cir. 2000) (examining ERISA administrator's fiduciary duty); Noorily v. Thomas & Betts Corp., 188
F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding no fiduciary duty where insurer makes pure busi-
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conflict would be found if an insurer incurred a direct profit from denying
benefits and lacked incentive to balance the conflict on its own. 10 2 Recently, the court accepted the opportunity to clarify the requisite standard
of review applied in ERISA cases.1 °3
III.

PYrro v.

RELIANCE STANDARD INSURANCE CO.: THE THIRD CIRCUIT

ADOPTS A HEIGHTENED STANDARD OF REVIEW

FOR

ERISA

CONFLICT OF

INTEREST CASES

In Pinto,the Third Circuit held that a heightened arbitrary and capricious standard of review should be employed when an administrator of an
ERISA plan denies benefits while under a conflict of interest. 10 4 In so
holding, the court attempted to resolve the uncertainty created by the Su10 5
preme Court's decision in Firestoneconcerning this issue.
A.

Facts and ProceduralHistory of Pinto

In June 1992, Maria Pinto applied for long-term disability benefits
("LTD") from Reliance Standard Insurance Company ("Reliance"), which
was under contract to administer and pay LTD benefits pursuant to her

ness decision); Mitchell v. Eastman Kodak Co., 113 F.3d 433 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that without conflict of interest, court would not use heightened review);
Epright v. Envtl. Res. Mgmt. Inc. Health & Welfare Plan, 81 F.3d 335 (3d Cir.
1996) (using arbitrary and capricious review standard); Haberern v. Kaupp Vascular Surgeons Ltd. Defined Benefit Pension Plan, 24 F.3d 1491 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating requirements to find fiduciary duty of plan administrator); Gillis v. Hoechst
Celanese Corp., 4 F.3d 1137 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that use of arbitrary and capricious standard predated Firestone); Luby v. Teamsters Health, Welfare, & Pension
Trust Funds, 944 F.2d 1176 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that trial court properly used
de novo review where plan administrator had no discretion to decide benefits).
102. See Nave v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co., No. 98-3960, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13382 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 1999) (noting that administrator's dual role triggered
heightened review); Nolen v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 32 F. Supp. 2d 211, 216
(E.D. Pa. 1998) (requiring heightened standard of review); Morris v. Paul Revere
Ins. Group, 986 F. Supp. 872, 881-82 (D.N.J. 1997) (same); Rizzo v. Paul Revere
Ins. Group, 925 F. Supp. 302, 309 (D.N.J. 1996) (same), affd, 111 F.3d 127 (3d Cir.
1997).
103. See Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377, 390-93 (3d Cir.
2000) (discussing standard of review used in ERISA conflict cases); Orvosh v. Program of Group Ins. for Salaried Employees of Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 222 F.3d
123, 129 (3d Cir. 2000) (same).
104. For a discussion of the holding in Pinto, see infra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
105. For a discussion of the reasoning behind the decision in Pinto, see infra
notes 117-26 and accompanying text.
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employer's ERISA plan. 10 6 Shortly thereafter, Reliance granted Pinto's
10 7
application for LTD benefits.'
In November 1993, Reliance terminated Pinto's benefits, citing various medical reports that declared that she was able to work. 10 8 Pinto filed
an ERISA action in the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).10 9 The statute provides that
a beneficiary may sue for "benefits due to him [or her] under the terms of
[the] plan."1 10 In January 1997, Reliance moved for summary judgment
on the ground that its decision was discretionary, not arbitrary and capriThe district court granted
cious, and therefore could not be disputed.'
112
appealed.
Pinto
and
the motion
B.
1.

The Third Circuit'sAnalysis

The Holding of Pinto

The Third Circuit concluded that close scrutiny, in the form of
heightened arbitrary and capricious review, is necessary when an insurance company both administers and funds an ERISA plan. 113 In other
words, the potential for self-dealing by an insurer requires a court to examine the fiduciary's pronouncements with close attention, not with deference. 1 4 The court acknowledged that it had a duty to ensure that a
fiduciary complies with the responsibilities Congress intended for fiducia106. See Pinto, 214 F.3d at 379-82 (stating facts of case). In July 1991, Maria
Pinto stopped working due to health problems, and thereafter received short-term

disability benefits from her employer. See id. at 379. Her physician stated that "her
present condition precludes her from actively working even at a clerical level...
[and that] her only viable option at the present time is continued medical therapy,
sedentary life style, and avoidance of high stress situations that could precipitate
her cardiac asthma." Id. at 379-80.
107. See id. at 380.
108. See id. Reliance requested that Pinto also apply for Social Security benefits. See id. In May 1993, the Social Security Administration ("SSA") found that
Pinto was not disabled and denied her application for benefits. See id. In November 1993, Reliance terminated Pinto's benefits, citing the SSA's decision. See id.
109. See id. In February 1994, the SSA reversed its earlier decision and
awarded Pinto benefits. See id. Although a Reliance employee recommended that
Pinto's benefits be reestablished, the insurance company rejected Pinto's appeals
for reversal of its earlier decision. See id. at 381.
110. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (a)(1)(B) (1994).
111. See Pinto, 214 F.3d at 382 (stating procedural history).
112. See id. The district court purported to apply the arbitrary and capricious
standard "shaped by the circumstances of the inherent conflict of interest," but
instead proceeded to explain that "an administrator's decision will only be overturned if it is without reason, unsupported by substantial evidence or erroneous as
a matter of law." Id. (quoting Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., No 96-3508
(D.N.J. Dec. 12, 1998)).
113. See id. at 389 (reviewing rationale for holding).
114. See id. at 392 (examining fiduciary duty of plan administrator). The
court did not, however, establish a per se rule requiring that heightened scrutiny
be applied in any case where the insurer both funds and administers a plan. See id.
at 388 n.6 (recognizing that specific facts could warrant different outcome).
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ries when it enacted ERISA.1 5 Thus, the Third Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case, suggesting that the
16
administrator's decision was in fact arbitrary and capricious.

2.

The Third CircuitDetects a Conflict of Interest

Prior to Pinto, the Third Circuit had not addressed the precise problem of which standard of review to apply when examining the discretionary decision of an independent insurance company that both funds and
administers an ERISA plan.1 17 In Pinto, a two-part analysis was employed
in determining that a form of heightened review, greater than mere deference, is obligatory in this type of situation. 1 8 The court analyzed and
determined: (1) the circumstances under which a conflict of interest occurs in an ERISA plan, 1 9 and (2) the standard of review that courts in the
120
Third Circuit should use when a conflict is detected.
First, the court settled that a conflict inherently exists when an insurer, who has discretion to interpret an ERISA plan, both funds and administers the plan. 121 The Third Circuit concluded that the structural
biases intrinsic in the configuration of the insurance company as both decision-maker and payment provider obliges the court to confirm that a

115. See ERISA, H.R. REP. No. 93-533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in
1974 U.S.C.A.A.N. 4639, 4640 (noting defects that concerned Congress regarding
failure to protect individual pension rights); see also Heyl, supra note 6, at 2382
(arguing that ERISA should ensure that employees receive benefits promised to
them under their employer's pension and health programs).
116. See Pinto, 214 F.3d at 394 (stating that "a factfinder could conclude that
[the insurer's] decision ... was the result of self-dealing instead of the result of a
trustee carefully exercising its fiduciary duties").
117. See id. at 386 (noting that Third Circuit had never addressed issue of
conflicted ERISA fiduciary).
118. See id. at 378-79 (discussing necessary approach to decide standard of
review in case of conflicted ERISA fiduciary).
119. For a description of occasions where a conflict of interest arises for an
ERISA fiduciary, see supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
120. For a discussion of the standard of review used to scrutinize an ERISA
fiduciary's decision, see supra notes 65-82 and accompanying text.
121. See Pinto, 214 F.3d at 383 (analyzing conflict formation in ERISA plan).
Other circuits have differing opinions as to the circumstances under which a conflict arises for an ERISA fiduciary. Compare Lang v. Long-Term Disability Plan of
Sponsor Applied Remote Tech. Inc., 125 F.3d 794, 797-93 (9th Cir. 1997) (applying heightened review because there was evidence that decision was influenced by
conflict), and Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 898 F.2d 1556, 1561 (lth
Cir. 1990) (finding inherent conflict where insurance company funds and administers plan), with Mers v. Marriot Int'l Group Accidental Death & Dismemberment
Plan, 144 F.3d 1014, 1020 (7th Cir. 1998) (presuming that insurance company is
not under conflict when it both funds and administers plan).
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conflict exists. 122 Once a conflict is recognized, the Third Circuit will ap123
ply a standard of review that acknowledges this inconsistency.
Second, and more importantly, the court realized that some kind of
heightened standard of review is essential when a conflict is present; however, Firestone required the use of an abuse of discretion standard in this
situation. 124 Thus, the Third Circuit recognized the need to incorporate
the fact and degree of the conflict into the review of the administrator's
decision, while at the same time giving the fiduciary deference.' 25 The
Third Circuit called its test the heightened arbitrary and capricious standard of review, based on the sliding scale model used in the Fourth, Fifth,
12 6
Seventh and Tenth Circuits.
3.

The Heightened Arbitrary and Capricious Standard

When an ERISA fiduciary operates under a conflict, the Third Circuit.
uses the heightened arbitrary and capricious standard to review the fiduciary's decision.1 2 7 The Pinto decision determined that conflicts would be
integrated as a factor when applying this standard, based on a sliding
scale.' 28 Essentially, the sliding scale determines the intensity of review,
which adjusts according to the strength of the conflict.' 29 This standard is
very deferential if the conflict is minor; however, the Third Circuit can
examine the decision with a "high degree of skepticism" if there is evi30
dence of a substantial conflict.1
122. See Pinto, 214 F.3d at 388 ("[I]nsurance carriers have an active incentive
to deny close claims . . ").
123. See id. at 390 (defining proper standard of review). Not every court
agrees upon the circumstances in which a conflict of interest is found on the part
of the plan administrator. Compare Brown, 898 F.2d at 1561-62 (holding that plan
administrator had inherent conflict of interest because insurance company administered policy and incurred direct expense in determining benefits in favor of plan
participants), with Chojnacki v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 108 F.3d 810, 815-16 (7th
Cir. 1997) (adopting de minimus test to determine whether plan administrator was
acting under conflict of interest).
124. See Pinto, 214 F.3d at 390 (stating that court developed its analysis so that
Firestone is given some real meaning). The court reasoned that Firestone would be
given further meaning with the decision that a claimant need only show inequity to
gain the advantage of close scrutiny. See id. at 389 (noting need to "infuse[ ]
some meaning into the Firestoneregime").
125. See id. at 390 (noting need for higher standard of review when ERISA
fiduciary is under conflict).
126. For a discussion of other courts' use of the sliding scale model, see supra
notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
127. See Pinto, 214 F.3d at 392 (describing sliding scale rationale of heightened arbitrary and capricious model). The court noted that it did not like the
terminology "heightened arbitrary and capricious" because it could be easily confused with intermediate scrutiny; however, the court decided the term accurately
described the requisite process of scrutinizing an ERISA fiduciary's decision. See
id. ("The locution is somewhat awkward.").
128. See id. (incorporating status of fiduciary into analysis).
129. See id. (explaining use of sliding scale).
130. See id. at 393-94 (applying sliding scale analysis).
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IMPACT OF THE HEIGHTENED ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS STANDARD
OF REVIEW IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT

A.

Application of the Standard in the Third Circuit

The Third Circuit currently uses a heightened arbitrary and capricious standard of review in ERISA cases when a fiduciary is conflicted, as
demonstrated by the many recent district court decisions employing the
Pinto test.] 3 Courts in the Third Circuit now examine both the actual
result and the process through which the administrator arrived at a benefit denial. 132 Accordingly, the deference given to an administrator's deci3
sion is not absolute.'1
Summary judgment is inappropriate for a case in the Third Circuit if
a fact-finder could ascertain that the conduct of a plan administrator was
the result of self-dealing rather than that of a fiduciary protecting the best
interests of the plan's beneficiary.' 3 4 If there is any evidence that tends to
show self-dealing, then summary judgment is not appropriate. 13 5 Accordingly, the standard used by the court is critical for insureds and insurers
36
alike who litigate these ERISA cases.'
The decisive importance of this newly developed standard is amply
demonstrated in the Third Circuit's recent decision in Orvosh v. Program of
131. See id. (setting forth standard of review); see also Leonardo-Barone v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co., No. 99-6256, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19001, at *32 (E.D. Pa.
Dec. 28, 2000) (following rationale of Pinto); Ernest v. Plan Adm'r of the Textron
Insured Benefits Plan, 124 F. Supp. 2d 884, 891-93 (M.D. Pa. 2000) (using less
deferential standard for fiduciary conflict); Krause v. Modern Group Ltd. & Subsidiaries Employee Welfare Benefit Plan, No. 00-CV-534, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18208, at *19 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 19, 2000) (acknowledging circumstances under which
heightened arbitrary and capricious standard of review is necessary); Carone v.
Teamsters Local 469 Pension Fund, No. 99-2145, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18543, at
*6 (D.N.J. Dec. 7, 2000) (same); Friess v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 122 F.
Supp. 2d 566, 575 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (noting that conflict gives rise to skepticism on
part of court); Norris v. Cont'l Cas. Co., No. 00-1723, 2000 U.S. Lexis 13993, at *3
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 26, 2000) (noting rationale of Pintorule); Skretvedt v. E.I. DuPont
De Nemours & Co., 119 F. Supp. 2d 444, 450 (D. Del. 2000) (reviewing sliding
scale test); O'Sullivan v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 114 F. Supp. 2d 303, 304, 308-15
(D.N.J. 2000) (using Pinto rule); Cohen v. Liberty Life Assurance Co., No. 99-2007,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9171, at *9 (E.D. Pa. June 29, 2000) (following Pinto test).
132. See Pinto, 214 F.3d at 393 (requiring that district courts use sliding scale
model).
133. See id. at 393-94 (applying heightened arbitrary and capricious standard
of review).
134. See Orvosh v. Program of Group Ins. for Salaried Employees of Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 222 F.3d 123, 129 (3d Cir. 2000) (discussing summary judgment process of review).
135. See Pinto, 214 F.3d at 392 (using conflict as consideration in reviewing
administrator's decision).
136. See Heightened Arbitrary and CapriciousStandard Applies to PennsylvaniaERISA Claim, MEALEY'S LIT. REP., Aug. 2000, at 2 (discussing dismissal of summary
judgment motion for insurer); MollyJ. Liskow, Issue of Whether Insurer-Administrator
Satisfied the Pinto Standard of Review Precluded Grant of Summary Judgment, N.J. LAW.,
Oct. 23, 2000, at 18 (same).
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Group Insurancefor Salaried Employees of Volkswagen of America, Inc.13 7 In
Orvosh, the court reversed a grant of summary judgment to an employee,
insured pursuant to an ERISA plan, by relying on an unmodified arbitrary
and capricious standard of review rather than the heightened arbitrary
and capricious review.' 38 In so holding, the court exemplified that the
level of scrutiny given to a fiduciary's decision is the key factor in resolving
whether an insured recovers benefits under an ERISA plan, particularly
when the fiduciary acts under a conflict of interest. 139
B.
1.

An ERISA Fiduciary's Responsibility in the Third Circuit

Significance of Pinto to Insurers and Insureds

In the Third Circuit, when a fiduciary both funds and administers a
plan, a conflict of interest will customarily be found, which in turn affects
the judicial analysis of the fiduciary's decisions regarding benefit distribution. 140 The Third Circuit utilizes a sliding scale approach when examining ERISA cases in which review can be "ratcheted upward by . . .
suspicious events." 141 This standard comports-with the historical treatment of ERISA conflicts by the Third Circuit, which has traditionally held
14 2
fiduciaries to a high standard.
137. 222 F.3d 123 (3d Cir. 2000).
138. See Orvosh, 222 F.3d at 131-32 (discussing holding). Orvosh brought suit
under facts similar to those in Pinto; however, the parties agreed to use a deferential review standard. See id. at 125-29 (stating facts of case). The court made special note of the fact that the parties stipulated that the standard of review would be
unmodified, arbitrary and capricious, even though the insurer both funded and
administered the plan. See id. at 129. In doing so, the court reinforced the importance of the standard used to review a fiduciary's decision. See id.
139. Compare Friess v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 122 F. Supp. 2d 566,
575 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (noting that conflict gives rise to skepticism on part of court),
with Orvosh, 222 F.3d at 123 (finding in favor of insurer with conflict).
140. See Pinto, 214 F.3d at 393 (stating that heightened arbitrary and capricious standard is proper in order to protect beneficiaries under ERISA); see also
Ernest v. Plan Adm'r of Textron Insured Benefits Plan, 124 F. Supp. 2d 884, 891-93
(M.D. Pa. 2000) (using less deferential standard for fiduciary conflict); Friess, 122
F. Supp. 2d at 575 (noting that conflict gives rise to skepticism on part of court);
Skretvedt v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 119 F. Supp. 2d 444, 450 (D. Del.
2000) (reviewing sliding scale test); O'Sullivan v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 114 F. Supp.
2d 303, 308-15 (D.N.J. 2000) (using Pinto rule).
141. Pinto, 214 F.3d at 394. Many district courts in the Third Circuit have
followed the Pinto test since the case was decided. See, e.g., Leonardo-Barone v.
Fortis Benefits Ins. Co., No. 99-6256, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19001, at *32 (E.D. Pa.
Dec. 28, 2000) (following rationale of Pinto); Ernest, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 884 (using
less deferential standard for fiduciary conflict); Krause v. Modem Group, Ltd. &
Subsidiaries Employee Welfare Benefit Plan, No. 00-CV-534, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18208, at *19 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 19, 2000) (acknowledging circumstances under which
heightened arbitrary and capricious standard of review is necessary); Carone v.
Teamsters Local 469 Pension Fund, No. 99-2145, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18543, at
*6 (D.N.J. Dec. 7, 2000) (same).
142. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's treatment of ERISA standard of
review cases, see supra notes 131-41 and infra notes 143-57 and accompanying text.
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Currently, in the Third Circuit, an employee has a way to bring an
ERISA action by which the court will not automatically defer to the decision-making process of a conflicted fiduciary. 143 Instead, a fiduciary's decision will be scrutinized, consistent with both the purpose of ERISA and
trust law principles in general. 144 In addition, insurance companies in the
Third Circuit are forewarned that if they reject a claim under a plan that
they both fund and administer, the court will review the decision with a
level of scrutiny that depends upon the nature of the conflict. 145
2.

Heightened Review: An EquitableApproach

Trust law requires that if a fiduciary has discretion in administering a
plan, the standard of review used by the courts is the deferential abuse of
discretion model; however, ERISA requires that a fiduciary act in the best
interests of the plan's beneficiary. 4 6 In the Third Circuit, these two obligations are equitably harmonized by use of the heightened arbitrary and
capricious standard.' 47 This standard of review defers to the administrator of an ERISA plan, while at the same time it acknowledges that a conflict of interest can be a significant factor in reviewing the decision. 48
In addition, the heightened arbitrary and capricious standard properly reconciles the administrator's dual role of fiduciary with that of profitmaker for the company.149 When an ERISA plan grants an administrator
discretion in a clear and unequivocal manner, judicial deference to the
143. See Motley, supra note 11, at 20 (noting that Third Circuit uses heightened arbitrary and capricious standard).

144. See Heyl, supra note 6, at 2390-94 (discussing ERISA's legislative
background).
145. See Liskow, supra note 136, at 18 (discussing facts under which summary
judgment is inappropriate under Pinto standard).
146. See ERISA H.R. REP. No. 93-533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in
1974 U.S.C.A.A.N. 4639, 4650; see also Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 898

F.2d 1556, 1561 (11th Cir. 1990) (discussing role of fiduciary). The court in Brown

noted that:
Because an insurance company pays out to beneficiaries from its own assets rather than the assets of a trust, its fiduciary role lies in perpetual
conflict with its profit-making role as a business. That is, when an insurance company serves as ERISA fiduciary to a plan composed solely of a
policy or contract issued by that company, it is exercising discretion over
a situation for which it incurs "direct, immediate expense as a result of
benefit determinations favorable to [p]lan participants."
Id. (quoting DeNobel v. Vitro Corp., 885 F.2d 1180, 1191 (4th Cir. 1989)).
147. See Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377, 393 (3d Cir.
2000) (stating that court will not be "absolutely deferential").
148. See H.R. REP. No. 93-533 (discussing significance of fiduciary conflict); see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (1959) (reviewing conflict of

fiduciary).
149. See Beatty, supra note 32, at 735 (discussing development of arbitrary and

capricious model). For a discussion of the heightened arbitrary and capricious
standard in the Third Circuit, see infra notes 146-57 and accompanying text.
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decision-maker is appropriate and required. 150 In response to this judicially created rule, many insurance companies have inserted discretionary
language into their plans in order to qualify for deference. 15 1 Surely, however, ERISA was not enacted so that a fiduciary's decisions would receive
deference at the expense of the beneficiary.' 52 The heightened arbitrary
and capricious standard adopted by the Third Circuit suitably scrutinizes
an administrator's decision in these circumstances to ensure that the ben53
eficiary is adequately protected, as ERISA requires.'
Furthermore, the heightened arbitrary and capricious standard
abides by precedent set by the Supreme Court in Firestone,as well as establishes an equitable solution for ERISA beneficiaries. 1 54 The trend in the
other federal circuits validates that affording an administrator some, but
not absolute, deference is logical.1 55 Accordingly, the heightened arbitrary and capricious standard of review adopted in the Third Circuit appropriately reconciles the incident of a fiduciary's conflict with the
responsibility to the beneficiaries of an ERISA plan. 15 6 In addition, if the
Supreme Court one day settles the circuit split regarding this matter, insurers and insureds alike can be reasonably confident that the standard
currently used in the Third Circuit will comply with the Court's
1 57

resolution.

150. See Brostron, supra note 3, at 10 (considering development of deferential
review standard).
151. See Heyl, supra note 6, at 2418 (outlining aftermath of Firestoneand insur-

ance companies' response to decision).
152. See H.R. REP. No. 93-533 (noting that ERISA does not require deference
to fiduciary's decision); see also Langbein, supra note 31, at 217-19 (predicting that
insurance companies would change language in plans so that they could qualify
for deference from courts).
153. See Leonardo-Barone v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co., No. 99-6256, 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 19001, at *32 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 28, 2000) (following rationale of Pinto);

Ernest v. Plan Adm'r of the Textron Insured Benefits Plan, 124 F. Supp. 2d 884,
891-93 (M.D. Pa. 2000) (using less deferential standard for fiduciary conflict);
Krause v. Modem Group, Ltd. & Subsidiaries Employee Welfare Benefit Plan, No.
00-CV-534, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18208, at *19 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 19, 2000) (acknowledging circumstances under which heightened arbitrary and capricious standard
of review is necessary); Carone v. Teamsters Local 469 Pension Fund, No. 99-2145,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18543, at *6 (D.N.J. Dec. 7, 2000) (same); Friess v. Reliance
Standard Life Ins. Co., 122 F. Supp. 2d 566, 575 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (noting that conflict gives rise to skepticism on part of court).
154. See McKnight, supranote 5, at 25 (discussing role of conflict of interest in
ERISA plans).
155. For a description of the analysis employed by other circuit courts, see
supra notes 59-82 and accompanying text.
156. See Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377, 383 (3d Cir.
2000) (reviewing requirements of Firestone).
157. See ERISA Administration and Funding, supra note 11, at 4 (noting that
Supreme Court may have to resolve question of standard of review for ERISA case
of conflicted fiduciary).
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A Note for the Practitionerin the Third Circuit

The initial relevant question for Third Circuit practitioners, who are
preparing for an ERISA case in which a conflicted fiduciary issued a benefit denial, is whether a conflict of interest exists.' 58 If a conflict is present,
then a court examining the ERISA fiduciary's judgment will not use absolute deference, but instead will factor the conflict into its review of the
decision. 159 This method restrains the decision-making process of the
plan administrator so that the beneficiary is protected.' 60 At the same
time, if the administrator acts reasonably to protect the plan and the bene61
ficiaries, the Third Circuit will defer to his or her judgment.1
Inevitably, the Third Circuit's application of the heightened arbitrary
and capricious standard provides an advantage to plaintiffs. 162 Prior to
Pinto, an insurance company would be granted a motion for summary
judgment in an ERISA benefits denial claim even if the fiduciary made a
decision under a conflict.'163 Now, the Third Circuit will not automatically
defer to the decision-making process in an ERISA claim and mechanically
grant summary judgment in ERISA cases; instead, the court will examine
64
the decision with closer scrutiny, thus protecting the insured.'
V.

CONCLUSION

The Third Circuit has rightly established a heightened arbitrary and
capricious standard of review to assess a conflicted administrator's decisions in an ERISA plan. 165 The heightened standard now required in the
Third Circuit for ERISA cases is appropriate given the statute's purpose of
protecting employees' benefit plans. 166 The standard not only protects
158. For a discussion of factors that determine whether a conflict of interest
exists, see supra note 5 and accompanying text.
159. See Orvosh v. Program of Group Ins. for Salaried Employees of Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 222 F.3d 123, 129 (3d Cir. 2000) ("[O]ur inquiry turns on
whether [the insurer was] arbitrary and capricious in [its] interpretation of the
Plan's LTD requirement.").
160. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Potter, 992 F. Supp. 717, 730 (D.N.J. 1998)
(discussing dual role of administrator under conflict).
161. See Brostron, supra note 3, at 32-33 (noting that reasonable decisions will
receive court's deference, but that insurance companies are put on notice that
their decisions will not be deferred to automatically).
162. See Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377, 393-94 (3d Cir.
2000) (discussing facts of case and deciding that conflict may exist).
163. See Orvosh, 222 F.3d at 129, 132 (stating that grant of summary judgment
for Orvosh would be reversed).
164. See McKnight, supra note 5, at 18 (discussing reasonableness of sliding
scale approach). For ftirther discussion of summary judgment in ERISA conflict
cases, see supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
165. For a discussion of the heightened arbitrary and capricious standard of
review for a conflicted administrator's decisions in an ERISA plan, see supra notes
127-30 and accompanying text.
166. See Mass. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 148 (1985) (stating
that ERISA was designed to protect contractually defined benefits for employees);
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employee benefits as mandated by ERISA, but also places insurers on notice as to the appropriate weight a conflict should be given in choices re167
garding benefits.
Monica M. Lawrence

Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983) (stating that ERISA was enacted to protect employees).
167. For a discussion of Pinto's effect on insured and insurers, see supra notes
140-61 and accompanying text.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2001

25

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 4 [2001], Art. 5
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol46/iss4/5

[Vol. 46: p. 855

26

